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AMENDING THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT: SHOULD THE BRIBERY ACT 2010
BE A GUIDELINE?
Michael Peterson*
INTRODUCTION
On December 19th, 1977, President Jimmy Carter signed into
law the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).1 This Act prohibited
the “furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, authorization of
the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authoriza-
tion of the giving of anything of value” to a foreign official.2 As early as
1981, members of Congress introduced bills to amend the Act due to
numerous complaints from the business and legal communities.3 Both
proponents and opponents of amending the FCPA set forth arguments
in May, June, and July of 1981.4 Similarly, in 2011, both sides debated
the merits of the Act, along with what each side viewed as “improve-
ments” to the Act.5
While the United States debated its own anti-bribery act, the
United Kingdom passed the Bribery Act 2010.6 Until 2009, British
prosecutors had never convicted a company of bribery due to outdated
legislation and the perception of bribery as “a necessary cost of doing
business in certain countries.”7 As one world power debates the merits
of amending its long standing anti-bribery law and another world
power passes a similar yet distinct law, it is appropriate to look at one
in the context of the other. This paper compares American and British
* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of Richmond; B.A. 2011, The University of
Kentucky.
1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq. (1998). See Presiden-
tial Statement on Signing the Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclo-
sure Bill (Dec. 20, 1977), available at http:/www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws?pid=
7036.
2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78 dd-1(a).
3 See Bartley A. Brennan, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977:
“Clarifying” or “Gutting” a Law, 11 J. LEGIS. 56, 57 (1984).
4 Id. at 56.
5 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Crime, Ter-
rorism, and Homeland Security of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011)
[hereinafter FCPA: Hearing] available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/
printers/112th/112-47_66886.PDF.
6 Bribery Act 2010, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
7 UK Passes One of The World’s Strictest Anti-bribery Laws, BAKER & MCKENZIE
(Aug. 2010), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/UKbriberyact.
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anti-bribery law, and proposes that while the United States should
amend the FCPA, it should generally not amend its anti-bribery laws
to be similar to the stricter Bribery Act of 2010.
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section dis-
cusses the individual legal aspects of the FCPA and the Bribery Act of
2010; the second section discusses the differing features of the two
acts; the third section discusses the criticisms of each of the acts; and
the fourth section lays out a proposal of effective amendments which
the author feels should be made to the FCPA.
SECTION ONE: THE ACTS
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
In the United States, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) as passed in 1977 and amended in 1988 and 1999, “was en-
acted for the purpose of making it unlawful for certain classes of per-
sons and entities to make payments to foreign government officials to
assist in obtaining or retaining business.”8 In essence, this law makes
it unlawful to cause, directly or through agents, an act furthering a
corrupt payment either directly to a foreign official, or knowing that
all or a portion will be given or offered to such foreign official, within
the the United States.9 Specifically, the FCPA prohibits using an in-
strument of interstate commerce, “in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money or giving
of anything of value” to: (1) any foreign official; (2) any foreign political
party or official thereof; or (3) to any person when you know that all or
a portion will go to any foreign official or foreign political party.10  This
Act, however, also creates exceptions for payments, “to expedite or to
secure the performance of a routine governmental action.”11 These
routine government actions include actions ordinarily and commonly
performed in obtaining official documents, processing paper work, pro-
viding police protection, providing utilities, or in protecting perishable
products.12 As a defense, one can argue that the payments in question
were (1) lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign
country and/or (2) a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as
travel and lodging expenses.13 The FCPA also has imposed certain re-
quirements in maintaining records that accurately and fairly reflect
8 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act – An Overview, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.just
ice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa (last visited Mar. 6, 2013) [hereinafter DEPT. OF
JUSTICE].
9 Id.
10 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1998).
11 Id. §78dd-1(b).
12 Id. §78dd-1(f)(3)(A).
13 Id. §78dd-1(c).
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transactions.14 It also requires a system of internal controls to ensure
the accuracy of such books and records.15 As such, this Act extends to
cover not only American corporations, but everyone conducting busi-
ness within the United States.16 The International Anti-Bribery and
Fair Competition Act of 1988 amended the FCPA to improve the com-
petitiveness of American business and promote international trade.17
The penalties for breaching the FCPA range from jail time and large
fines to exclusion from tendering for US government contracts.18 More
specifically, penalties can include fines up to $250,000 for individuals
or $2 million for companies, prison sentences of up to 20 years, federal
oversight of company operations, nullification of contracts, revocation
of import/export licenses, and loss of product registration.19 These pen-
alties are in addition to the reputational damage and negative public-
ity of breaking the law and bribing foreign officials.20 Meanwhile,
neither the anti-bribery or accounting provisions have any express or
implied private right of action.21
Bribery Act 2010
The Bribery Act 2010 made it an illegal for a person to offer,
promise, or give a financial or other advantage to another person while
i) intending the advantage to induce improper performance of a rele-
vant function; ii) intending the advantage to reward a person for the
improper performance; or iii) knowing or believing that acceptance of
the advantage would constitute improper performance.22 It does not
matter if the person receiving the advantage or the offer of an advan-
tage is the person who may actually perform or has performed the
function or activity, nor does it matter if the person intending to bribe
acts directly or through a third party.23 Section 6 of the Act creates a
similar offense for anyone who bribes a foreign public official with the
intention to influence the official in her or his capacity as a foreign
public official.24 This Act also makes it an offense for a person to: i)
14 See Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419, 419 (2012).
15 See id.
16 See DEPT. OF JUSTICE, supra note 8.
17 International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
366.
18 WORLD COMPLIANCE, THE END OF CORRUPTION, available at http://www.fcpa-
worldcompliance.com/pdf/fcpa-brochure.pdf (last visited Mar.6, 2013)
19 Understanding Anti-Bribery Laws, YALE, http://world-toolkit.yale.edu/restric
tions/fcpa (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
20 See id.
21 Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1024 (6th Cir. 1990).
22 Bribery Act 2010, 2010, c. 23 § 1(1)-(3) (U.K.).
23 Id. § 1(4)-(5).
24 Id. § 6.
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agree to or accept an advantage intending to improperly perform a rel-
evant function as a consequence; ii) request or accept an advantage
which itself constitutes improper performance; iii) agree or accept an
advantage as a reward for an improper performance; or iv) perform an
improper function in anticipation of or as a consequence of requesting
or accepting an advantage.25 Relevant functions are those that are (a)
functions of a public nature; (b) any business activity; (c) activity in the
course of a person’s employment; or (d) any activity performed by or on
behalf of a body of persons.26 To qualify as a relevant function, the
function must be conducted by a person expected to perform such ac-
tivity in good faith, impartially, and in a position of trust.27 Finally,
this Act holds organizations responsible for failing to prevent a person
associated with the organization from committing bribery with the in-
tention of obtaining or retaining business or an advantage for the or-
ganization.28 However, it is a full defense if the organization can show
that it has in place, adequate procedures to prevent bribery by associ-
ated persons.29 The Ministry of Justice produced guidance under Sec-
tion 9 of the Act “about procedures which relevant commercial
organizations can put into place to prevent persons associated with
them from bribing.”30
SECTION 2: COMPARISON OF ANTI-BRIBERY ACTS
There are several important and distinct differences between
the United States’ FCPA and the UK Bribery Act 2010 including: 1)
whom it is an offense to bribe; 2) offenses for receipt of bribes; 3) corpo-
rate offenses; 4) the extent of criminal penalties; and 5) exceptions.31
The foremost difference between the acts regards to whom it is an of-
fense to make payments. While the FCPA prohibits direct or indirect
payments to foreign officials and political parties,32 the UK Bribery
Act 2010 prohibits any advantage paid to any person with the inten-
25 Id. § 2.
26 Id. § 3.
27 Id.
28 Id. § 7; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010-GUIDANCE 8, available at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf.
The Bribery Act and its guidance use the British English spellings “organisation”
and “defence,” but for the continuity of this article, the author has used the Ameri-
can English spellings.
29 Bribery Act 2010 § 7; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 28 at 8.
30 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 28 at 2.
31 David Flint & Valerie Surgenor, The UK Bribery Act 2010 v Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977: How Different Are They and Should Your Business be Con-
cerned?, ASS’N OF CORP. COUNSEL (Apr. 23, 2010), http//www.lexology.com/li
brary/detail.aspx?g=fa55bb1d-ff5d-4575-81d3-07acb4cfc0d7.
32 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1998).
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tion to induce an improper performance or reward for an improper per-
formance,33 including, but not limited to, foreign officials.34 Under the
FCPA, one can only be punished for paying an individual who is not a
foreign official or a member of a foreign political party if the payment
is made knowing that a portion of the value is going to a foreign official
or political party.35 The Bribery Act, however, does not require a con-
nection to a foreign official for a bribe to fall within its purview.36 By
having made it an offense to bribe a larger group of individuals, it is
much easier to violate the Bribery Act 2010 than the FCPA. It may be
particularly relevant that it is illegal to make payments to corporate
leaders who are not in any way connected to a foreign government
under the Bribery Act 2010, but similar prohibitions are not included
under the FCPA.
Second, the two laws differ greatly in whether it is only an of-
fense to provide a bribe or whether it is also an offense to receive such
benefits. The Bribery Act 2010 not only criminalizes providing a bribe,
but also makes it an offense to request, receive, agree to receive, or
anticipate an advantage as a consequence of performing an improper
relevant function.37 However, the FCPA contains no such provision
concerning the receipt of bribes.38
Third, the acts differ regarding strict liability offences of corpo-
rate offenders. The Bribery Act 2010 holds corporations strictly liable
for failing to prevent bribery.39 “Under the Bribery Act, companies will
be liable if anyone acting under its authority commits a bribery of-
fence. Such persons can include employees, consultants, agents, sub-
sidiaries and joint venture partners.”40 However, having adequate
oversight procedures to prevent bribery offenses acts as a defense.41
Again, the FCPA does not contain such a provision and does not have
strict liability offenses for companies.42
Fourth, the acts differ in the severity of criminal penalties for
bribery offenses. The FCPA creates fines of up to $2 million per viola-
tion by companies and up to $250,000 fines for individuals along with
33 Bribery Act 2010, 2010, c. 23 § 1 (U.K.).
34 Id. § 6.
35 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-1(a)(3).
36 See Bribery Act 2010 § 1.
37 Id. § 2.
38 Flint, supra note 31 (highlighting the differences between the FCPA and the
Bribery Act).
39 Bribery Act 2010, 2010, c. 23, § 7 (U.K.).
40 Flint, supra note 31.
41 Bribery Act 2010 § 7; Flint, supra note 31.
42 Flint, supra note 31.
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up to 5 years imprisonment.43 The Bribery Act on the other hand al-
lows prosecutors to impose an unlimited fine and sentences of up to 10
years.44
Finally, the acts differ in how they treat legal facilitation pay-
ments versus bribes. The FCPA allows the facilitation or expedition of
payments to expedite or secure the performance of a routine govern-
ment action and payments, as long as the offers and gifts were lawful
within the recipients’ country.45 Such payments are also allowed if
they are part of reasonable and bona fide expenditures related to “the
promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services” or
the execution of a contract.46 The Bribery Act 2010 has no such excep-
tions or defenses.47
SECTION 3: CRITICISMS OF THE ACTS
Criticisms of FCPA
The FCPA has received harsh criticisms from its inception. As
early as 1978, there were major criticisms regarding vagueness of the
definitions, which prompted some commentators to suggest that the
vagueness has “forced American corporations to forego business oppor-
tunities abroad for fear of violating the FCPA.”48 Since 1978, the cor-
porate and non-corporate worlds have changed, and the United States’
economy has recently suffered. “America is suffering through a severe
and prolonged economic downturn,” according to the Chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security.49
Businesses that try to comply with the FCPA claim that the law’s en-
forcement is vague and impenetrable.50 There has been a dramatic in-
crease in the number of cases the Justice Department has prosecuted
during this time. These cases have resulted in a staggering amount of
43 Id. The maximum prison sentence for a violation of the Bribery provisions is 5
years. A 20-year prison sentence is applicable to willful violations of the Books and
Records and Internal Control Provisions.
44 Id.
45 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b).
46 Id. § 78dd-1(c).
47 See Bribery Act 2010, 2010, c. 23 (U.K.); see also Flint, supra note 31 (compar-
ing the FCPA and the Bribery Act).
48 Brennan, supra note 3, at 62-63. See generally Business Accounting and Foreign
Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearings on S. 708 Before the Subcomm. on Secur-
ities and the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong. 4 (1981) (statement
of Sen. William Proxmire, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban
Affairs).
49 FCPA: Hearing, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner,
Jr., Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security).
50 Id.
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fines, making up half of all Department of Justice Criminal Division
penalties in fiscal year 2010.51 In 2010 alone these fines totaled some
$1.8 billion dollars and included eight of the ten highest fines ever paid
under the FCPA.52 The rise in prosecutions has been so drastic that
the United States Department of Justice has prosecuted more cases
than any of the other 37 member countries of the Organization of Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Brib-
ery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions.53 Some critics worry that the “over-aggressive enforce-
ment” and the rise of prosecutions disadvantages U.S. companies, es-
pecially when competing with companies in the global marketplace
that are not subject to U.S. law.54 In response, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce has now prioritized amending the FCPA.55 Corporate lob-
byists’ attempts to curb the FCPA have also sparked widespread de-
bate about how the legislation is enforced.56 In 2011 the general
concern regarded statutory definitions, specifically those of “foreign of-
ficial” and “instrumentality.”57 As Representative Robert Scott stated,
“[o]ne of the problems is the contention that the Justice Department
and the SEC are interpreting the definition of ‘foreign official’ too
broadly, especially when it comes to payments to companies that are
state owned or state controlled.”58
The FCPA has also been criticized because it does not inquire
about intent or willfulness when dealing with corporate violations.  Vi-
olations of the FCPA have expanded to not only cover bribes that busi-
ness officials actually authorized or know, but also include “bribes a
business owner or executive should have known were being made.”59
While Congress amended the “reason to know” standard in 1998, it
has substituted concepts of willful blindness and conscious disre-
51 Id.
52 FCPA Year in Review 2010, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (Mar. 15, 2011), http://
www.steptoe.com/publications-newsletter-129.html#_ftn1.
53 FCPA: Hearing, supra note 5 at 3 (statements of Rep. Robert C. Scott, Member,
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security).
54 Id.
55 Joe Palazzolo, Critics Target Bribery Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 28, 2011), http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204753404577064061604755308.html?
user=welcome&mg=id-wsj.
56 Id.
57 FCPA: Hearing, supra note 5, at 3 (statements of Rep. Robert C. Scott, Member,
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Security).
58 Id.
59 Michael P. Tremoglie, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is ‘Sword of Damocles,’
Critic Says, LEGAL NEWSLINE LEGAL J. (July 16, 2012), http://legalnewsline.com/
in-the-spotlight/236735-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-is-sword-of-damocles-critic-
says.
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gard.60 However, this has still left the Act to apply to those who are
“aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstances,” or
“should have known.”61 The Act is essentially prohibiting actions that
fall short of positive knowledge.62 While these amendments impose a
mens rea requirement to reduce possible liability for accidental viola-
tions,63 the “should have known” standard still leaves room for such
violations to result in criminal liability. Amendments have been sug-
gested for changes to the intent requirements for corporate
defendants.64
The FCPA, and the cases surrounding it, have also received
criticism over the lack of a private right of action under the FCPA.65
The basis of this criticism is that denying citizens the right to bring
actions means that the inadequacies of the Act, ones that are not rem-
edied by actions of government agencies, Congress, or the courts, are
not being solved and the Act is being inadequately enforced.66 While
the recent increase in prosecution may have tempered the strength of
this argument, commentators still contend that a private right of ac-
tion should be included in FCPA enforcement because the rise in en-
forcement actions has led to collateral civil litigation based on alleged
violations of federal securities laws, antitrust laws, state laws pro-
scribing tortious interferences with prospective contractual relations,
and other statutes being pursued as class actions or shareholder deriv-
ative actions.67
Criticisms of Bribery Act 2010
Despite its relatively young age, the United Kingdom’s Bribery
Act 2010 is not without its opponents. The main criticisms of the Act
are that it is too broad and inhibits British corporations competing
abroad. The Act, which was hurriedly passed in 2010 during the La-
bour government’s last days, saw growing warnings about its conse-
quences as early as January 2011 before the Act even became
60 H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under The Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 31 (1998).
61 Id.; see also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(ii) (1998).
62 Justin Serafini, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 721, 734
(2004).
63 James A. Barta & Julia Chapman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 49 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 825, 832 (2012).
64 Id at 861.
65 Mark, supra note 14, at 448.
66 Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private
Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 215-16 (1994).
67 See Mark, supra note 14.
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effective.68 At that time, the Government confirmed that the Bribery
Act 2010 would be reassessed as part of a drive to ease regulatory bur-
dens on business.69 Legal experts have said that the law could hypo-
thetically punish companies just because of their weak compliance
procedures, which could unduly hamper British companies competing
abroad. There are also fears that what has been described as the
toughest anti-bribery law in the world could go so far as to punish
small corporate gifts and drive away corporate sponsors.70 While the
Act was rewritten prior to coming into force, business still feared the
extremely broad corporate criminal offence of “failing to prevent a
bribe by an associated person.”71
Another major criticism of the Bribery Act has been the ban on
facilitation payments, which are allowed under the FCPA.72 Those
most affected by this ban include pharmaceutical, defense, and energy
and construction sectors. The Ministry of Justice has produced gui-
dance on the Act that, along with comments from Justice Secretary
Kenneth Clarke, suggest that only extreme cases are likely to result in
enforcement activity.73 However, this leaves ambiguity for corpora-
tions hoping to abide by the Act and avoid liability.74 The Ministry of
Justice’s guidelines did little to quash criticisms of the Act. Instead it
caused new criticisms from those who believe the guidance watered
down the Act’s intentions, while prosecuting authorities still have
plenty to do, and companies plenty to worry about.75 Some critics hold
that Parliaments attempt to craft a zero-tolerance approach to bribery
is overshadowed by various problems including enforcement difficul-
ties and the failure of the Ministry of Justice’s Guidance in explaining
68 See James Kirkup, Bribery Act to be Reviewed After Business Fears, TELEGRAPH
(Jan. 14, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/bribery-act/8258
368/Bribery-Act-to-be-reviewed-after-business-fears.html.
69 Id.
70 See id.
71 See Alex Bailin, Revamped Bribery Act is Giving Firms the Jitters, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/apr/01/revamped-bribery-act-
firms-jitters.
72 See id.
73 Id.
74 See id.
75 See generally, Jonathan Russell, Serious Fraud Office Risks Clash with Minis-
try of Justice over Bribery Act, THE TELEGRAPH (July 1, 2011), http://www.tele
graph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/bribery-act/8609486/Serious-Fraud-Office-risks-
clash-with-Ministry-of-Justice-over-Bribery-Act.html.
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compliance.76 The Act has been referred to as “the ballyhooed U.K.
Bribery Act” and “the caffeinated younger sibling of the FCPA.”77
SECTION 4: PROPOSAL
In light of the criticisms of the existing anti-bribery law, and
the lack of a comprehensive international bribery compliance pro-
gram,78 I propose amendments to the FCPA, but only one amendment
that should be adopted from the U.K. Bribery Act 2010.
The only amendment that should be made to the FCPA to
make the act more similar to the Bribery Act 2010 is a full defense for
corporations who have adequate procedures, programs, and practices
in place to monitor and prevent bribery by associated persons.79 Such
a provision would allow companies to avoid criminal liability if em-
ployees or contractors who committed the violation circumvent the
procedures the company has in place to prevent bribery.80 It is practi-
cal to allow compliance programs, which train employees and help
identify actual or potential problems,81 to be a defense for the company
on the occasion they do not work since these measures are a deterrent
and companies invest substantial funds into them.82
At a congressional hearing in 2011, members of the Committee
on the Judiciary who both supported and opposed major amendments
to the FCPA came together for a suggested amendment that added a
compliance defense. This defense would allow companies to avoid
criminal liability if individual employees or agents who committed
FCPA violations circumvented adequate procedures that were other-
76 See Bruce W. Bean & Emma H. MacGuidwin, Beyond All Boundaries: The Ex-
traterritorial Grasp of Anti-Bribery Legislation: Expansive Reach—Useless Gui-
dance: An Introduction to the U.K. Bribery Act 2010, 19 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L
323, 346 (2012).
77 See Joe Palazzolo, Law Blog Job of Week: SFO Director, WALL ST. J. (Oct 25,
2011, 1:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/10/25/law-blog-job-of-week-sfo-direc
tor/.
78 See generally Jon Jordan, The Need For a Comprehensive International Foreign
Bribery Compliance Program, Covering A to Z, in an Expanding Global Anti-Brib-
ery Environment, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 89 (2012) (suggesting that an analysis of
the guidance on compliance procedures provided through various international
and domestic agencies can provide a minimum set of procedures that should be
included in any international foreign bribery compliance program.).
79 Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7 (2) (U.K.).
80 See FCPA: Hearing, supra note 5, at 3 (statements of Rep. Robert C. Scott,
Member, Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security).
81 See id.
82 See id.
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wise reasonable in preventing bribery.83 Similarly, as seen with the
Bribery Act 2010, companies can implement these adequate proce-
dures through training, internal and external communication, and in-
stituting internal controls.84 With these compliance devices and the
encouragement of a corporate defense, companies can develop pro-
grams through a continuous process of implementation, monitoring,
reporting, and improving compliance programs in order to achieve its
objectives. By using a corporate defense amendment to encourage com-
panies to invest in corporate-wide compliance programs, the FCPA
will be more successful in preventing bribery and companies will have
less fear of the exuberant penalties for violations of which the corpora-
tion was unable to stop.
The conclusion that the United States should avoid amending
the FCPA to be more like the Bribery Act 2010 does not mean that the
FCPA should never be amended. Amendments, for example, can still
be made to further encourage companies to prevent bribery through
internal controls. On this point, instead of adopting the Bribery Act
2010’s adequate procedures defense, the FCPA could be amended to
mandate that corporations doing business abroad have anti-bribery
procedures in place. In essence, the FCPA could be amended to be sim-
ilar to the United State’s Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.85 The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act mandated several reforms to enhance corporate responsibil-
ity and enhance financial disclosures in order to combat corporate and
accounting fraud.86 Section 302 of this Act, for example, required prin-
cipal executive officers to, among other responsibilities, establish and
maintain internal controls.87 Section 404, meanwhile, requires an an-
nual internal control report that shall:
(1) state the responsibility of management for establish-
ing and maintaining an adequate internal control struc-
ture and procedures for financial reporting; and (2)
contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent
fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the inter-
83 See FCPA: Hearing, supra note 5, at 3-5 (statements of Rep. Robert C. Scott,
Member, Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security; statements of
Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Member, Committee on the Judiciary).
84 See PETER WILKINSON, THE 2010 UK BRIBERY ACT ADEQUATE PROCEDURES: GUI-
DANCE ON GOOD PRACTICE PROCEDURES FOR CORPORATE ANTI-BRIBERY PROGRAM-
MES 53-61 (Robert Barrington et al. eds., 2010), available at http://www.transpar
ency.org.uk/our-work/publications/95-adequate-procedures—-guidance-to-the-uk-
bribery-act-2010.
85 See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201.
86 See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
87 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 7241.
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nal control structure and procedures of the issuer for fi-
nancial reporting.88
By implementing similar requirements regarding bribery prevention,
Congress can ensure that every company doing business abroad has
adequate procedures to prevent bribery. This amendment would be im-
plemented in a similar fashion as in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, by hav-
ing an agency (such as the Securities and Exchange Commission for
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) create the exact rules which must be followed
in creating and auditing the internal controls designed to prevent
bribery.
Congress should also amend the FCPA to eliminate concerns
regarding vagueness, which is also an issue in the Bribery Act 2010, by
providing more precise and workable definitions. Companies specifi-
cally cite problems with the current statutory definitions of “foreign
official” and “instrumentality.”89 U.S. companies contend that the Jus-
tice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission are in-
terpreting the definition of “foreign official” too broadly, especially
when dealing with payments to state owned or state controlled compa-
nies.90 The difficulty for U.S. companies and their employees is that it
is not immediately apparent whether a manager or other employee is
considered a foreign official in the sense contemplated by the law.
Some feel that this allows for overly-aggressive enforcement which dis-
advantages U.S. companies in the global marketplace.91 While the law
specifically prohibits payments to foreign officials, the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce wants to clarify whether “employees of companies with
state ownership or control behind them qualify as such.”92 Up to this
point, the Justice Department has taken an expansive view of the defi-
nition and argued, “that virtually every employee a pharmaceutical
company encounters in a state-run health-care system could be consid-
ered a foreign official.”93 Again, the problem of not having a clear un-
derstanding of who is a “foreign official” has generated support for
more clear and precise definitions from multiple congressional mem-
bers within the House Committee of the Judiciary.94 There are two
potential ways that Congress could deal with these ambiguities, espe-
cially regarding the definition of “foreign official.” Congress could (1)
88 See id. § 7262.
89 See FCPA: Hearing, supra note 5, at 3 (statements of Rep. Robert C. Scott,
Member, Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Palazzolo, supra note 55.
93 Id.
94 See FCPA: Hearing, supra note 5, at 3-5 (statements of Rep. Robert C. Scott,
Member, Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security; statements of
Rep. John Conyers, Jr., Member, Committee on the Judiciary).
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amend the FCPA to provide a more precise definition of “foreign offi-
cial”; or (2) like the Bribery Act 2010, remove the “foreign official” re-
quirement and create liability for bribing anyone in the course of
business. However, the second option appears implausible since most,
if not almost all, calls for amending the FCPA want to make the Act
less powerful. However, giving a more precise statutory definition to
“foreign official” will help guide companies, the Justice Department,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the judiciary in enforc-
ing the rules and rationale of the FCPA. Defining “foreign official” as
only those who are a direct link to the government of a foreign nation
will give clarity to U.S. companies dealing with state-run companies in
the global marketplace.
Another amendment recommendation for the FCPA to assist
corporations in avoiding the most severe penalties, while also assisting
the enforcement of the FCPA, is to reduce the penalties for those who
self-report violations. The shift from sporadic to more aggressive en-
forcement of the FCPA has been attributed, in part, by some Justice
Department officials to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002’s requirement for
corporate officers to certify the accuracy of their financial state-
ments.95  According to these officials, this requirement has led to more
companies discovering potentially illicit payments and has led to more
companies disclosing such discrepancies to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and the Justice Department.96 While companies
are already forced to make disclosures under Sarbanes-Oxley, and
companies are developing more internal procedures for identifying po-
tential FCPA violations, an amendment that would give companies a
reduction in penalties for self-reporting violations would be a positive
change. Such a proposal, reducing penalties by as much as 40%, is al-
ready under consideration by lawmakers.97 While Justice Department
officials say companies are already given credit for cooperation, these
reductions for cooperation need to be specifically quantified so that
companies and boards can make informed decisions, according to Rob-
ert Tarun of Barker & McKenzie LLP, who authored the discount pro-
posal.98 This proposal can also work hand-in-hand with the two other
proposals mentioned above. Companies may be more likely than ever
to self-report by combining a corporate defense for adequate proce-
dures with a reduction in penalties for self-reporting. Both the ade-
quate procedure incentive, which should help companies identify more
possible violations, and the protection of lower penalties for self re-
ported violations if the procedures are not found to be adequate will
95 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 302(a); Palazzolo, supra note 53.
96 Palazzolo, supra note 55.
97 Id.
98 Id.
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encourage more self-reporting. Also, this amendment could be com-
bined with a statutory requirement for internal controls and reporting
on internal controls to raise awareness and reporting without fear of
the stiffest penalties. Amendments combining the implementation of
statutorily required internal controls and reporting with less severe
penalties for self-reported infractions appears to be the avenue under
which the United States could best lower instances of bribery viola-
tions and effectively deal with violations while not overly burdening
United States companies competing abroad.
Finally, the FCPA could be amended or the courts’ rulings
overturned to create a private right of action, whether explicit or im-
plied, for investors damaged by FCPA violations. This proposal, rather
than deal with government enforcement for criminal liability, deals
with what some see as the primary purpose of the FCPA, protecting
investors.99 If the intention of the Act is, at least in part, to protect
investors in the United States, it appears that those investors, as pri-
vate citizens, should be able to bring claims against companies for vio-
lations. Commentators have argued that the courts should recognize
an implied private right of action, or that Congress should amend for
an explicit private right of action, at least for violations of the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA.100 Such an amendment could be useful
in enhancing clarification of the FCPA’s provisions through increased
enforcement.101 Approximately 77% of FCPA enforcements by the De-
partment of Justice and Security and Exchange Commission are re-
solved by deferred prosecution agreements or non-prosecution
agreements.102 This means that little is being done in the way of judi-
cial scrutiny or interpretation with the result that the FCPA means
“what the enforcement agencies say it means.”103 Allowing for private
actions to be brought regarding FCPA enforcement, which explicitly
removes the Department of Justice and Security and Exchanges Com-
mission from the process, may result in more cases reaching the
courts, allowing judicial review and interpretation of the provisions of
the FCPA that have been criticized for ambiguities. However, even
with the high number of cases being settled outside of full prosecution,
as the enforcements brought by the Department of Justice continue to
increase, judicial review may be possible without a private right of
action.
99 Tremoglie, supra note 59.
100 See, e.g., Mark, supra note 14, at 419.
101 Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private
Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 220 (1994).
102 Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the “Culture of Com-
pliance”, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 697 (2012).
103 Mike Koehler, The Fac¸ade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J, INT’L L. 907, 907
(2010).
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CONCLUSION
The FCPA was passed in 1977 and amended in 1998 to combat
bribery of foreign officials in the global marketplace. In 2010 the
United Kingdom passed the Bribery Act 2010 in response to interna-
tional criticisms for failing to effectively join the fight against bribery.
These two acts differ in several key components, including: 1) whom it
is illegal to bribe; 2) liability for the receipt of bribes; 3) corporate
defenses for adequate internal procedures; 4) amount of monetary pen-
alties and length of incarceration terms; and 5) the legality of “facilita-
tion payments.” Nether act is free from an abundance of criticism and
many specific calls are being made to amend the FCPA. It is important
that the FCPA is amended in a way that will lower instances of bribery
committed by companies while not limiting the ability of United
States’ companies to compete in the global market place. This article
shows that the FCPA should not be amended to mirror the Bribery Act
2010 except for allowing a corporate defense for companies with ade-
quate procedures designed to identify and prevent bribes. However,
there are several other options for amending the FCPA such as requir-
ing internal controls and reports on these controls; judicially or con-
gressionally clearing ambiguous definitions, specifically “foreign
officer”; reducing penalties in instances of self-reported violations; and
creating an implied or explicit private right of action for FCPA
enforcement.
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